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Richard Barichello

Introduction
Marketing quotas have errerged during the decade of the seventies as a
major instrument of Canadian agricultural policy. This is partly due to the
increased fornation of farm marketing boardsl in general, but more inportantly,
to the increased nuITber of boards which have acquired the power to restrict
output or manage aggregate supply. The increased willingness of the government
to grant these powers (and their attendant instrument of control, marketing
quotas) reflects its desire to pay farmers higher prices yet avoid incurring
costly and errbarrassing surpluses of farm products. However, one effect of
these supply restrictions corrbined with regulated prices is the difficulty in
ooserving and estimating the actual supply curve. This leads to difficulty in
determining the economic effects of the regulation, such as how resource
allocation is being altered and how nuch income is being transferred from
consumers to producers.
This problem exists roore widely than in the supply managed (i.e., dairy
and poultry) sectors of Canadian agriculture.

It arises whenever aggregate

market supply is restricted by a quota and not determined by individual
producer behavior, effectively preventing the industry supply price from being
c:bserved at the margin of production. Some exanples include the Israeli dairy
and poultry industries, the English hop and potato industries and the
*A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Canadian
Economics Association annual n-eeting in Vancouver, B.C., June 1983 •.
Due to its gradual evolution, this paper has benefitted from the
corrments of many people, including workshop participants at Maryland,
Minnesota, U.B.C. and Yale, but I would particularly like to thank Rebert
Allen, Jonathan F.aton, Daniel Gordon, John Graham, Herbert Grubel, Michel
Patry, Anthony Scott and John Strauss. Responsibility for remaining errors
rests, of course, with me. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada provided partial financial support for this research
which is gratefully acknowledged.
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Austra lian dairy industr y.2 Although marketing boards are prevale nt in some
'!he rrarketing boards which provide the basis for this analys is can be described
as prQducer cartels where a monopoly solutio n may be sought and where the
proceeds of the roonopoly tax goes to holders of the quota (e.g., the
producers).

Unlike the i.rrport quotas so conmonly found in parts of the foreign
trade sector these agricu ltural quotas are held by a large nurrber of firms and
they are often traded in markets with ooservable prices . It is the oojecti ve
of this paper to show that when this quota market data is cotrbined with
institu tional details such as pricing and,quota allocat ion rules much can often
be disclos ed about aggregate supply prices and the economic effects of the
regula tion.
It should be made clear at the outset , that we are concerned with
marketing quotas which are defined in terms of production, and which can
usually be purchased or somehow ootained in an incremental fashion . The crux
of the natter is that the purchase or sale of this asset is a marginal
decisio n, determined by the usuai criter ia at the margin of produc tion. This
is in contra st to a license restric tion, where entry to the industr y is
condit ional upon the acquis ition of a license , yet output is not restric ted by
the licens e. -ihe distinc tion is irrportant for the exercis e undertaken in this
paper, because the .quota will attrac t only marginal rents whereas the license
will attrac t inframarginal rents.
Although it is not new to use quota stock prices to infer output supply
prices , the steps incorporated here represe nt an increase. in conple xity over
the procedure usually followed. -ihe standard treatment in analyzing quota
prices is to nultip ly the stock value by a curren t nominal interes t rate to
d:>tain the annual rent. In fact, the research reported here has been largely
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rootivated by serious shortcomings of this procedure cbserved in applying it to
the British Colurrbia dairy industry. For exanple, the sta-:3ard treabnent
"

provided no explanation for the rapid increase in B.C. milk quota values in the
1975-76 period (see Appendix 1).

In several jurisdictions, notably both the

B.C. egg and milk industries, it is difficult to rationally explain or
conprehend currently high levels of quota values.using the standard roodel.
Finally, in talking to individual farmers and agricultural bankers, references
to capital gains from the quota and a brief "payback period" are comm::mly made,
yet there is no systematic consideration of these factors in the standard
IOOdel.
The JOOdel reported in this paper rep~esents an atterrpt to analyze quo
tas roore realistically, drawing on well developed procedures for valuing other
financial assets such as comrron stocks. Although attention is given to the
potentially inportant factor of quota returns additional to current production
rents (e.g., capital gains), it is the risk associated with ·quotas that is
particularly inportant. - We suggest that one part of this risk is the
possibility that government policy will change, reducing the regulation=ereatec1
rents of the quota system, and that this is an inportant corrponent of the
unusually large apparent discount rates (earnings/price ratios) which are
cbserved.

An

application of these procedures is rrade to the B.C. dairy

industry with the cbjective of more accurately estirrating the supply price of
milk.

Analysis
Standard treatments of this quota (Arcus, Grubel and Schwindt, Veeman)
usually feature two steps. The industry equilibrium is described by Fig. 1,
with industry output restricted from an unregulated

Oe to the restricted level

Q.3 This creates a wedge between the derrand price P and the supply
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price C, measured by the rent, R. Secondly, the quota is assumed to take on a
value equal to the discounted stream of these rents. When this stream occurs
in perpetuity, the price of quota

Po

is sinply equal to R/r where r is the rate

of interest.
Unfortunately, few investments or capital assets are accurately
described so sinply and marketing quotas are no exception. In the analysis of

p
C

Q

Qe

Figure 1

common stock prices, their determinants are specified in a valuation model,
(e ..g., Elton and

Gruber; 1981, p. 397), the most theoretically attractive and

widely used of which is.the net present value or discounted cash flow model.
Accordingly, financial assets such as stocks are generally valued and, with
corrpetition, priced as the present value of the stream of net returns accruing
to ownership of that asset and expressed in the familiar net present value
equation,
N
E
i-=o

(1)

where Po= price of a unit of asset
Fi= net return or benefit from one unit of the asset in period i
ri = interest rate in period i
N = expected life of the asset.
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Although general, this equation makes onerous infornational derrands for
an asset of any reasonable life. 'Ibis is true for the stock analyst, the
farmer conterrplating quota purchase or sale and the econanist trying to analyze
the industry.

Some

si.rrplification is necessary, and one possible response is

to assume a constant level over tine of both the discount rate and the net
returns.

In terms of the farm investor this is equivalent to using an expected

average long run discount rate and net return in his valuation of the quota, a
reasonable formulation given the uncertainties facing a prospective quota
market participant. The value equation then becomes
Po=

N
I:
i-=o

F
(1

+

r)

1

(2)

This sirrplification is very helpful for analysis of the asset because
now the quota investment can be treated as an annuity. When Fi
the net present value equation can be solved for one of

Po,

=F

and r i

F, r, or

N

=· r,

when the

other three are known. '!he farmer in his quota purchase decision essentially
solves for Po, given his known or calculated values for the other three, the
familiar stock valuation problem. However, the economist wishing to determine
the economic effects of this regulation faces a different problem. Because the
quota asset often trades as a stock but is not usually rented, the market price
of quota

(Po)

can be observed and the rental price nornally cannot. After the

determination of N and r, however, one can calculate the net returns, F, and
subsequently the supply price, C. This describes the general strategy of the
paper•

What we obtain from this procedure is an estima.te of a point on the
industry supply curve. More specifically, it is the supply price of the subset
of farmers who are trading quota, the relevant aggregate ma.rgin of production.
'Ibis method does not provide the slope or elasticity of the supply curve.
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Because that information rrust be provided from other methods and data we cannot
determine the unregulated industry equilibrium solely from analyzing quota
price data.

We

can also interpret this supply price estimate as being drawn

from the long run supply curve. 'Ibis is suggested by the nature of the quota
purchase or sale decision as a capital decision, and this interpretation.. is
strengthened by the five-year prohibition on the resale of quota observed in
the British Colunbia dairy industry. Finally, although it may be attractive to
assume that this supply price enbodies the usual profit-maximizing conditions,
the only condition we actually assurre is that farmers rraxirnize profit with
respect to their quota purchase or sale decision, equalizing the demand price
for quota across farms (footnotes 9 and 10 elaborate).
Before enpirically applying such a sinplified. present value model as
(2) directly to agricultural quotas, two issues remain to be addressed. First,
we IIUst determine whether the marginal rents, R of Figure 1, exhaust the flow
returns, F, which determine the quota stock price. Secondly, following casual
observations that these quotas are "risky" assets we IIUst consider whether this
risk is appropriately captured in the discount rate and how it can be measured.
Be~.:.to -the Q.lota

Qle feature of agricultural quotas is the likelihocxl that current
production rents do not provide a conplete account of the expected annual net
returns which determine the stock price. Just as the ownership of a cornm?n
stock may yield both dividends and capital gains, so may the ownership of a
quota. In the former case, when a firm does not distribute all earnings as
dividends, future dividends, hence share prices, can be expected to grow at
some rate, g, from the reinvestment of retained earnings.
expected, capitalization into the stock value occurs.

As

this becomes
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In the case of agricultural quotas, production rents may also be ex
pected to grow over time, even in real terms. This is due to the likelihood of
continued technical change in the production of the cormodity conbined with the
particular pricing methods which have become institutionalized. Pricing is
often determined by a cost-based fornula which fails to capture fully the
technical inproverrepts being adopted at the econanic margin of production and
which is revised infrequently enough to fail to capture ioost input
substitution. The net result of these fornulae is an upward-biased measure and
growth ~ate of costs, hence prices which grow to systematically increase
pre>duction rents as long as these conditions continue.

In markets where they

are d:>served and expected to continue, quotas will continue to increase in
value and this expectation of capital gains will be capitalized. One rnethod of
incorporating these expectations is to reduce the discount rate by the expected
growth rate, g, IOOdifying the value equation to (3),
PQ =

N

F

!: - - - - 1
i=o (1 + r-g)

where g = the expected rate of growth in the price of quota or the production
'

rent. Only if we ignore the existence of capital gains will this analysis
yield the biased results suggested in Schmitz (1983).
Our interpretation of capital gains from quota ownership nust be broad
enough to enconpass ioore than price appreciation of the asset.

It is often

necessary to add new quota to the system to accomroodate demand growth and this
is sometimes accorrplished, at least in part, by giving new quantity allocations
to existing holders of the quota. Because demand growth precedes this increased
supply of quota, dilution of stock value does not occur, and as loD3 as indi
vidual holders of the stock are given at least some of the new issue, it can be
handled analytically as a capital gain. Of critical inportance for the
analysis is the usual rule by which new quota is allocated to existing holders.
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A proportiona l allocation, expected to add one percent per annum to a farrrer's
quantity of quota, is equivalent to an additional expected annual capital gain
of one percent, and this considerati on can be incorporated in equation (3) by
adjusting the value of g. 4
'!his discussion of net returns is corrplete only if current production
rents and capital gains exhaust the benefits of quota ownership. However there
would appear to be another benefit included in F which accrues to purchasers of
quota and is due to the tax system. Those who purchase quota may deduct from
income an allowance for depreciatio n of the quota (essentially a capital cost
allowance), even though quota does not depreciate in the usual sense and in
fact typically appreciates in value. 'Ibis tax advantage does not last forever,
as it is "recaptured " in capital gains taxation upon eventual sale. It is in
essence an interest-fr ee loan which grows as depreciatio n is clairred and con
tinues until the quota is sold.
'!he present value of this tax advantage per dollar of purchased quota,
including both the benefits from tax deductions during quota ownership and the
cost of paying back those deductions upon eventual sale (recapture) , is given
by TS

savings) in equation

(tax

TS •

where:

~ [1 f+p

.!::f
l+p

0

(4)
]
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-

[1-(1-f)n]

(1-p)n

(4)

f = allowed rate of depreciatio n
8 = effective marginal tax rate
P

= nominal discount rate of quota purchaser

n = expected holding period
'Ibis present value of the tax advantage from quota ownership represents
the extra amount a profit-maximizing purchaser would be willing to pay for each
dollar of quota bought. Rather than translate this into an artificiall y con
stant annual flow as part of F (equation 3) it can be used directly to deflate
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the observed market price (which already includes TS). F,quation (3) can then
be written with R, the production rent, substituted for F ?:'1d with the market
price, Po, having been appropriately adjusted.
Beneficiaries of supply control regimes often suggest that additional
benefits are conferred on quota holders. A ntmber of these benefits may in
fact flow from the regulatory regime, and taken collectively, they can form the
basis for some value placed by producers on belonging to the regulatory regime
or cartel. However, one relevant question is whether these benefits are margi
nal or inframarginal in nature. The producer purchasing incremental quota, who
is already a member of the cartel, enjoying the stability and predictability of
price, a certain narket for his product, and so forth, will not pay more for
those "environmental" benefits which he receives regardless of whether he buys
quota or not. The value of belonging to the cartel is the sum of all
inframarginal rents enjoyed by the narginal producer relative to the rents he
-would enjoy in an unregulated regime. This would enter his demand price for a
license, as discussed earlier. Alternatively, in a situation with no licensing
as such, it would determine how many resources a producer would be willing to
spend to lobby the government to preserve the regulatory regime. It would have
no effect on his denand for incrernental quota, where only narginal costs and
benefits apply. 5
However, this is not to deny that some features of the marketing board
regime nay have shifted the industry supply curve.

It is possible that the

board causes producer prices to be more stable and this nay have effectively
lowered farm costs, shifting the industry supply curve to the right.6 In this
case, these new supply conditions form the basis for farm decision-making and
the supply price revealed by analyzing quota prices is along the "new"
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supply curve. Being unable with current data to estimate the "old" supply
curve we can identify neither the sign nor the size of the net effect of the
board. Even if these effects were measured, they should not be added to the
quota's net returns because they are already inplicit in ci:>served quota prices.
'lbe Discount ·Rate and :Q.Jota Risk
Choosing an appropriate interest rate to discount future returns
necessarily involves considering the risk associated with the asset. This
rreans determining the level of returns additional to the risk-free return
(i.e., the "risk premium") which is necessary to conpensate holders of this
asset for the risk expected from it. The risk of an asset is usually rreasured
by the prci:>able dispersion (variance) of its future returns and deconposed into
systematic (market-related) and unsystematic (firm-specific} portions. With
perfect capital markets, the market valuation of this risk depends on the
extent of the systematic risk (the asset's "ll" value), or on the variance and
covariances of its returns with those of alternative assets.
There is no ·question that the outcomes associated with agricultural
quotas are uncertain. Net returns vary, sometimes substa11tially; for all the
reasons one might expect in an agricultural enterprise.

In the dairy industry,

for exanple, net returns fluctuate with weather (e.g., crop and milk yield),
biological factors (e.g., herd health, reproductive success and milk yield),
input and output price changes and newly available inputs (technology} • In
turn, these sources of variance in expected returns can be classified into
systematic and unsystematic risk corrponents, just as can be done with the
variance of a stock's returns.
Recent experience in the Canadian dairy industry suggests that at least
part of the variance in net returns in that industry is systematic. The
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increase in real interest rates in the early 1980's affected this industry like
many others:

reductions in net cash flow, some bankruptcies and a notable fall

in real quota prices (Appendix 1). The ensuing recession in 1982-1983 led to
unexpected reductions in scheduled industrial milk price increases. Demand
growth for many dairy products also fell over this period, resulting in
industrial milk quota reductions at the farm level.
Bearing in mind that a unit of quota is like a share in the stock of
the dairy industry, unsystematic risk arises from farm and industry-specif ic
'

sources. These can include rrost of the factors listed above, and arguably
unsystematic risk is the larger corrponent of the total variance in expected
returns. This risk is diversifiable and with well-functionin g capital markets
and unrestricted quota trade, no risk premium from this source should be
demanded by the market, hence included in the discount rate. Lerner and
Stanbury (1983) make this argument and cor,duct their enpirical work
accordingly.
In practice, this position may be too strong because there appear to be
some inpediments to corrplete diversification . First, ~'lere are a variety of
quota transfer restrictions which vary by jurisdiction and do appear to
effectively reduce transactions. This exacerbates the problem of "thin"
markets which already affect a nunber of jurisdictions (e.g., the poultry
industry in Western Canada). Second, the size of typical asset holdings in
some quota-controlle d industries (e.g., the B.C. dairy industry) are well in

excess of a million dollars. The absolute size of a diversified asset
portfolio may force some farms to remain incorrpletely diversified unless they
issue shares, at least given present capital markets. And _widely-held
{non-family) share issue is often prevented by board regulations.
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In sum, even though there would appear to be less than average
systematic risk in holding these quotas, hence a small risk premium, there may
be some market premium for bearing unsystematic risk due to incorrplete
diversification. Although we do not presently have the data to measure it, we
conclude that the appropriate discount rate should incorporate some rrodest
premium for this familiar (variance, covariance4)ased) type of risk.
However, there is a less comrron feature of these agricultural quotas
which indeed contributes much risk and this relates to the regulated structure
of the industry. Because the size of the net returns and the existence of the
quota itself are conditional upon government-granted powers, regulations and
policies of the industry, there is some probability,;>.., that the government
will change or even eliminate those rules and policies. In the extrane these
possible changes will eliminate the total value of the asset and, at the very
least, the future returns and value of the asset would be reduced.
This type of risk might be described as "policy risk".

Its magnitude

is based upon the uncertain predictions of future government policy change or
regulatory board decisions, not on the more familiar basis of an historical
time series of returns variability. This risk, that the return some period
might with probability ;>. be negative and as large as the asset price itself,
affects the expected value of the asset instead of the variance of its future
returns, the risk incorporated in the discount rate. As such, it is analogous
to the default risk faced by international lenders, notably comrrercial banks
lending to foreign governments as analyzed recently by Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and Kletzer (1984). Just as a poor country may default on the repayment
of its international borrowings with some probability, lowering the expected
value of the lender's portfolio, so may a government change its agricultural
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policy with some probability, reking the quota purchaser's investment worthless
in that situation and reducing its expected value in any case.?
This situation can be modelled nost sinply by making this default risk
discrete - either the quota.regine is scrapped causing the loss of the quota
value itself, or it is mintained, with the flow of benefits as described in
(3). This adds a default term to our value equation, and with each situation
weighted by its respective probability we arr.ive at (5), the expected value of
the quota,

N

PQ =

(1 - A)F

E

i = 0

where A is the probability that the quota scheme will be scrapped, causing
rents, R, to fall to zero.8
Nothing has yet been mentioned of the remaining variable in this
expected value equation, the time horizon of the investrnent, N. How we
interpret and treat this variable is not independent of how we handle default
risk.

In the discussion above, the quota's risk is broken into two corrponents.

Systemtic risk is incorporated via some risk premium in the discount rate, and
default risk is included as a probability >. affecting the quota's expected
value. The expected life of the quota was inplicitly assumed to be a very
large nunber. For reasons of sirrplicity and because we have no clear
information to the contrary, we procede assuming an asset life of infinity.
Alternatively, one could express the default risk not by this paraireter
but by shortening the expected asset life (planning horizon) to some finite
nunber of years. This procedure is artificial in one sense because an increase
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in perceived default risk will appear as if the planning horizon was shortened
despite no actual change in expected asset life. But it does have the
intuitive appeal of corresponding to the notion of a "payback perioo" and for
our purpose of estimating R from values of

Po these

two alternative depictions

of default risk are alm::>st equivalent. In the errpirical part of the paper,
calculation s of this payback perioo will also be presented.
With an infinite time horizon, equation (5) can be sirrplified, and
collecting tenns it becomes (6)

(1 - A) F

r + A- g

(6)

Applying this IOOdel of quota pricing to determine industry supply price
in a corrpetitive environment, we can incorporate the tax benefits of quota

ownership as discussed earlier by deflating the cbserved quota price by the
present value of the tax advantage. If we denote this adjusted quota price as

Pfro, we can express equation
R.

directly in tenns of marginal proouction rents
'!be supply price, C, is the output price less the proouction rent, and R is
(6j

given in (7) by rearranging (6).

(7)

If we let r* = r +l A...
g , our operational equation R = r*Prdr ·
- A
-.r·· lS
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similar to the standard procedure (R = iPo) initially criticized. The
difference is in the structure and errpirical choice involved in the right hand
side variables. It would be fortuitous if a nominal marke:. interest rate was
the appropriate value for r*.
To illustrate the application of these conceptual tools to an enpirical

situation, we will examine fluid milk quotas in the British Colunbia dairy
industry in 1980 to determine the supply price of milk at that tine. The
advant~ges of this particular errpirical application are that the B.C. fluid
quota market includes most of the features noted above, we are able to measure
the default risk of the quota, conditional upon discount rates chosen, and this
market features the highest price of fluid quota in Canada.

~ . i ; Q r u The B,c, Milk Irrlust_zy
Before proceeding with quantifying equation (5) , a few details on the
institutional structure of the B.C. dairy industry may be in order. As with
most dairy industries, there is a two part market for milk, a fluid or fresh
milk ("Class I") market and a manufactured or industrial milk market, producing
cheese, butter, ice cream and skim milk powder. Virtually all prcx:lucers ship
to both markets and health or quality standards are likewise the sarre. Farm
prices paid for fluid milk are fornu.ila determined, and the seven conponent in
dices reflect movement in general inflation, wages and salaries, and a selec
tion of milk inputs.

The formula is constructed as a ten year moving average

and consequently the milk price is reasonably straightforward to predict.
Because the fluid price is attractive, access to this market is restricted by
fluid milk quotas.

Individuals face relatively few barriers to the transfer of

quota between farms, subject to certain minirrurn levels on the size of the
transaction and a five year holding period before resale. Consequently, an
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active market exists, including a nurrber of quota brokers.
'!be industrial (nanufacturing) milk price is also determined by a for
nula, this time at the federal level, and although this price is considerabl y
lower than the B.C. fluid price, it is still.suffic iently attractive to B.C.
milk producers to require additional quota restriction s to keep total B.C. pro
duction of industrial milk within the province's allocated quota. This quota,
called market sharing quota or MSQ, is distinct from fluid quota (although not
unrelated, as will be seen later). These regulations put all of a producer's
output under the constraint of a quota although this was not always so. B.C.
only entered the national milk supply nanagement scheme, under which authority
for

MSQ

exists, in 1973 and the provincial

MSQ

allocation became a binding con

straint only in 1975. This detail is irrportant, as it later provides us with
the means of calculating the discount rate. Unlike fluid quota in B.C. or MSQ
in Alberta, Cntario and Q..Jebec,

MSQ in

B.C. is not traded but allocated admin

istratively on the basis of a variety of criteria.
Cne of these criteria is relevant to the denand for fluid quota because
since 1976 some

MSQ

has been provided free of charge to certain fluid quota

purchases. To ensure-a nargin of flexibility to dairymen in meeting their
fluid quota, given the inevitable production fluctuation s due to weather, herd
health, or other biological factors, the Board has usually promised fluid quota
purchasers whatever additional MSQ is necessary (if any) to cover milk produc
tion of 10 percent above their new fluid quota holding. Like the tax provision
noted earlier, this rule provides an additional benefit to fluid quota buyers,
increasing the value of F. Also, this benefit will be most valuable to those
producers who qualify for the full 10 percent MSQ allocation (and who can be
expected to dominate the narket). If we assurre that MSQ is as valuable as fluid
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quota (likely an upward biased estirrate of MSQ value because the corresponding
milk price is only .seventy percent of the fluid milk price), then this benefit
is worth one-tenth of the value of fluid quota.

If this does overstate the

value of the benefit we will understate the production rent and overstate the
supply price by an amount less than 10 percent.
Now we
(7) •

turn to determining the values of

P1ro,

g, r and

). for equation

Both Po and g can be determined with quota price data generated in the

fluid quota market for the Lower Fraser Valley region, the major dairy
I

production region of B.C.

As

data from this market are the enpirical backbone

of the paper sore discussion of their nature and accuracy may be useful.
Sllbject to mininurn transaction size and resale restrictions, fluid quota
transfers relatively freely among producers (usually through the iriternediary
of a broker). '!be regulatory body, the Milk Board, neither taxes nor otherwise
controls the terms of the transaction. '!be data we use are gross of brokerage
fees and collected ultimately from the brokers themselves. Since 1978 the
provincial Ministry of Agriculture and Food has collected these data on a
monthly basis, published with a series of ob'1er input prices, while those for
1971-1977 were collected directly by the author and Grubel and Schwindt (1977).

Annual averages and rates of change are found. in Appendix 1. '!be nurrber of
traders and transactions indicate that prices are carpetitively determined,
and

information about these prices is possessed widely enough to result in a

low dispersion of transaction prices each nonth. 9,10

In conclusion, these data appear to be reasonably clean and appropriate
for our purpose. hly periodic noise in monthly figures will be minimized by
our use of annual averages. '!be average quota price observed in 1980 is $155
per pound of daily production, or $96.44 per annual hectolitre, corresponding
to our variable Po.
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This value IIUst now be adjusted to p,rQ in order to take into account
the two benefits which distinguish F from R. The first adjustnent is necessary
to account for the capitalization of tax benefits accruing to quota purchasers.
&cpirical esti.rcates of the present value of this tax saving (equation 4) are
between 1.75 and 1.78 percent of the purchase price (Barichello and Glenday,
1983). When the stock price is deflated by the mean estirrate it becomes $94.77.
A second adjustment is needed to account for the capitalization of the
benefit of free

MSQ

allocation to quota buyers. Valuing this benefit at 10

percent of the value of fluid quota as argued above, ooserved quota prices
should be deflated by 1.1, yielding an adjusted quota stock price of $86.15.
This price corresponds to p,rQ of equation (7) and is the average market price
purged of both tax and

MSQ

benefits to reflect only production rents, R.

'!he value of g, the expected rate of capital gain, could be determined
from the time path of net returns, but because it is unavailable for this
period we rely upon the time series of quota prices. However, the striking
characteristic of this price series is its erratic nature, especially when seen
in real terms. The year to year change in real price has ranged from -17 to +49
percent within the 1971 to 1983 period, all of this in an industry with a
stable pricing formula and sustained but gradual inprovements in technology.
The negative real price changes have been usually associated with rapid
increases in an input price, such as grain prices (1973) or interest rates
(1981-82), and the nost dram:1.tic increases in real price occurred with the
initial (1975) inposition of and subsequent (1978, 1983) cutbacks in MSQ.
This price change series does pose a challenge for the formation of
expectations of future capital gains. Because we have no d::>servations on the
actual expectations process of narket participants, we assume it displays the
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following characte ristics. First, with this history of unanticip ated events
and large resulting quota price response in both direction s, producers are

asswned to place a snall weight on any one year's experience. '!his is
equivalen t to considering a long series of price changes to keep srrall the
inpact of any one year's new price change infornati on. Secondly, because
recent price changes do little to depreciat e the value of older price change
infornati on, we assume that all have some relevance and that the weight given
to each ct>servation falls modestly from new to older d:>servations. Finally, if
some event is considered sufficien tly rare or unique, it may receive a
particula rly low weight in the expectati on. It may generally be difficult to
define a unique event, but one such exanple would seem to be clear in this time
series.
One method of incorporating these considera tions in a systemati c and
straightfo rward manner is to use geometri cally declining weights for the nine
years of available price change data (1972 to 1980), beginning with the rrost
recent (1980) ct>servation. '!be expected value of g is then approximated from
this series as
g

g ..

r

i .. 1

with i = 1 represent ing 1980, sunming back in time to 1972.

To

keep the time

•

profile of weights (k 1 ) relativel y flat we choose k = 0.95. When surveying the
1971-1980 period, one event stands out as a unique occurrence for the B.C. milk
I

market, the initial introduct ion of the industria l milk quota (MSQ). Although
this federal program, including quotas, was introduced earlier, MSQ became a
binding constrain t on B.C. milk producers only during 1975. It forced many
producers to reduce output or purchase fluid quota, resulting in a dranatic
junp in fluid quota prices which industry participa nts have sli:>sequently viewed
as a me-time event.

'lberefore , we have reduced the weight applied to this

1975 ct>servation to one-half of what it otherwise would be.
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When awlied to the data of Appendix I, these procedures give for 1980

a long run expected rate of real capital gain of 8.0 percent . With a price
series as variable as this, some of the differen t possibl e expecta tions models

can produce quite differen t values for g. In fact, with this pattern of prices
these differen ces are likely to be found across individu al producers as well.
We have opted for a systema tic and sinple model instead of a more ad hoc

procedure which incorpo rates nuch addition al judgmental infornat ion.11
Nevertheless, the possibi lity of error here in estinati ng g is clear, and
sensitiv ity tests will be undertaken.
'lbroughout the history of this marketing board reg:ine, there have been
increase s in aggregate quota, system-wide, in response to demand growth, sone
of which

been alloated without charge to existing produce rs. Allocat ion is
prq>ort ional to milk production in excess of one's fluid quota, essenti ally
has

<:lle's industr ial milk product ion. Although new allocati ons are not made with
explici t referenc e to fluid quota holding s, the close neasured relation between
fluid quota milk and excess milk production (consist ent with excess production
being chosen as some fraction of fluid quota production) neans that larger
fluid quota holdings will typicall y attract larger new quota allocati ons. Data
from 1974 to 1977 on new quota added to the system, adjusted for allocati ons to
existing producers,

and

weighted with gearetr ically declinin g weights as

describe d above-, gives an expected percentage increase in the quantity of fluid
quota of 1.25 percent . When added to the expected real price appreci ation of 8
percent we arrive at g = 0.0925 for the expected rate of capital gain.

Measuring·the-Disccxmt·Rate
'!here remains the task of determining rand A, measured in real terms
to be consiste nt with g. We are able to do this by conside ring the period
prior to the effectiv e inpositi on of

MSQ,

when production at the nargin was
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uncontrolled and from which we can cbserve both rents and quota prices. This

allows calculation of r*, the inverse of the price-eamin;. ~ .ratio, but we do
not have enough infornation to identify both r and

>. • As a result, we will

assume a value of r and calculate the inplied prcbability of default.

To

choose a value of r, we begin with Jenkin's estinate of the private real cost
of capital in Canada, 6 percent, the opportunity return on capital of all risks
facing farmers, averaged across sectors and over the mid-1960's to mid-1970's
decade. 12 However, on the basis of our earlier discussion of systematic quota
risk, the possibility of incoopletely diversified unsystenatic risk, and the
evidence of apparently fluctuating net returns shown in Appeooix 1, we choose a
value larger than this average, namely 8 percent.
Olr cbservations on r*, the earnings-price ratio, are possible due to
fortuitous changes in policies and institutional rules dnring this period.
Prior to B.C. 's entry into the federal market sharing program (late 1973),
there was no constraint on the production of Wustrial milk, or more
specifically to the dairy producer, no limit on his production in excess of his
fluid quota ("excess milk"). With a two price system and a quota on fluid
milk, the industry could be described with Figure 2, deleting for now any
reference to the denand side.
p

Q

Ql

Figure 2

Q
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'lbe price of fluid quota milk, PCJ-1, is exogenously determined by the
pricing fornula of the Milk Board, the fluid quota level is noted by

O,

and all

milk produced in excess of Q receives the excess milk price, PEM, the result of
exogenous federal goverrurent support prices for industria l milk products. With
supply curve

So,

production occurs at level Qi, of which Q is fluid milk and

{Qi - Q) is excess milk.

no longer the unobservable

In this situation , the current production rent
P-C

of Figure 1.

R

R

is

is still price less rrarginal

cost (supply price) but this is now the observable quota milk - excess milk
price differen tial, AC in Figure 2.
I£, however, the supply curve is described by S1, (PCJ-1 - Pm) will
overstate the rent R. Under these circunsta nces the quota rent will be AB < AC
and we are once again left with an und:>servable rragnitude for R. To identify R
we nust be able to distingui sh enpirical ly those periods when the supply curve
is character ized by
year) if

So

So and

s1. Over the longer term (say, year to
level Qthe price of excess milk exceeds its

those by

applies, at output

supply price. Productio n would be e.xpanded and we would expect to find a
significa nt volume of excess milk, OJ. -

Q.

'lbe level of excess production which could be terned "signific ant" is
difficult to.establ ish, if only because the supply curve is likely to be
shifting back and forth over tine with changes in input prices and clirratic
factors.

In addition there is a conplicat ion from fluid quota allocatio n rules

which penalize a producer for producing less milk than his quota allotment for
specified periods during two consecutive years. Because the penalty is a loss
of fluid quota, stochasti c influence s on production give producers
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an incenti ve to maintain a certain margin of production above quota
requirements. 'lhe alloca tion of MSQ is instruc tive in determining this margin.
To provide this safety in neeting fluid quota requirements, quota purcha
sers
are allocat ed enough

MSQ

to cover excess production of 10% above their fluid

quota.
Over the 1971 to 1975 period , excess production averaged 29% of the
quanti ty of quota milk produced, ranging by years from 26 to 30 percen t. Even
if we allow for twice the 10% insurance margin considered approp riate by the
MSQ alloca tion policy , we still find that actual excess production
is above
this higher margin. Given the stabili ty of milk produc tion, a margin of thirty
percen t of production as insurance to maintain fluid quota levels is both ex
cessiv e and highly unlike ly. Excess milk prices were high enough relativ e to
the supply curve to encourage a signifi cant production of milk over and above
fluid quota levels . 'lheref ore, it seems clear that on average the supply curve
from 1971 to 1975 can be depicte d by So in Fig. 2.
For shorte r period s t.ha11 a year, before any. substa.11tial decrease in
production would becorre widespread, the suwly curve could shift to an S1
positio n. Hard evidence for this is not availa ble, but any large price
increas e in one or more inporta nt inputs Su;:Jgests the possib ility. Over the
1971-75 period , the large increas es in real prices of dairy feed (+48%) and hay
(+52%) which occurred in 1973 provide one such exanple. 'lhese nUIIbers, alo119
with casual evidence from the industr y of a seriou s cost-p rice squeeze, make it
seem very likely that the first half of 1973 feature d a supply curve in the
positio n of S1. Later evidence supports this conten tion, and therefo re we are
unable to use the ct>servations for the first two quarte rs of 1973.
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Milk narket conditions in B.C. changed st.i:>stantially during 1975.
Despite the entry of B.C. into the
industrial milk quota allotment

MSQ

(MSQ)

program in Octcber 1973, the provincial

did not represent a binding constraint to

the province or individual producers until spring, 1975. At that time the
large milk production growth induced by the earlier provincial st.i:>sidies (the
Farm Income Assurance program discussed above) overcame the previously uninpor
tant MSQ allotment and an increasing nurrber of producers becaire constrained by
this second quota. lm.y production in excess of this

MSQ

would incur a penalty,

offsetting the excess milk price, and this penalty increased until by 1976, the
effective price for over-quota production was alm:>st zero. During 1975, the
narginal price facing producers varied by farm depending upon whether the pro
ducer was naking full use of his

MSQ.

By

the second quarter of 1976, virtually

all farmers were so constrained and sorre neasure of equilibrium was
reestablish ed. 'lhe industry by then was clearly described by supply curve S1,
and the rapid growth in fluid quota prices from the second quarter of 1975 to
the second quarter of 1976 reflect the adjustment to this new situation. 'Ihis
1975-76 period is relevant for us because it s1.13gests that supply curve So is
descriptive of the B.C. dairy industry only to the first quarter of 1975.
'!hereafter, from 1976 to date the suwly curve is better described by S1. MSQ
production is effectively infranargin al and its price has no effect on quota
values or industry equilibrium .
Because we have both quota prices (adjusted) and production rents for
this 1971-1975 period when

S0

was descriptive of the S':JPPlY curve, we can

calculate r*. It is worth recalling that this equation for r* assunes that
subject to a growth rate, g, expected returns are constant in real terms over
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time at the level of current production rents. With sone fifteen years of data

on these net returns (the milk price differential) this assunption can be
examined.

First, real fluid milk prices have been kept approxinately constant

by fornula, while real excess milk prices ·have tended to fall slightly from the
late 1950's to the early 1970's. Aside from indicating the growth rate g of
net returns, the data show that there was year to year variability in their
level. Almost yearly, the real returns altemated between generally small
increases and decreases, roostly the result of discontinuous changes in nominal
price levels and variations in inflation. 'lbe 1970's data show attenuation of
these changes, and provide general support for the assunption above, given our
attention to the 1971-1975 period.
But the variability of the data do alert us to the possibility that in
some periods, say quarters, current conditions may have been seen to be
unusual, such as from an unexpected policy or input cost change. Cbservations
which represent such periods are not likely to form the basis for expected
future returns and will be of questionable value to our sattple. en this basisi
three cbservations are suspect for our purposes of estimating longer term
default prcbabilities.1 3
To corrplete our calculation of ). from the equation
we first assume that r = 0.08.

"= (r*-r+g)/(l+r*)

To determine expected capital gains, g, over

this early 1970's period we have drawn on the

saire

guiding principles

elaborated earlier. However, because we have only two cbserved quota
transactions to illustrate prices prior to 1971, we JtUst turn to the flow
returns from the quota, the price difference between fluid quota milk and
excess milk. 'lbese data are available from the beginning of the schere, 1956,
but early years (1956-58) show erratic rrovements and are deleted. We are left
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with 14 price changes over the 1959-1973 period before new federal and
provincial policies altered both prices and regulations in 1974-75. Using
geometrical ly declining weights as before, g as expected in 1973, midpoint of
the 1971-75 period, is 1.8 percent per year.

In addition, there were inportant

quantity allocations of new quota. '!be expected percentage increase in new
quota was estimated from annual data since 1967 on aggregate (system-wide) new
quota increases, adjusted to percentage annual increases to existing prooucers
and weighted with geometrica lly declining weights as described before. 'Ibis
value, 1.4 percent per year, is added to the expected price increase of 1.8
percent to arrive at a total expected capital gain of 3.2 percent.
Finally, an adjustnent in the price of quota is again necessary to
account for the tax benefit (TS of equation 4). 'Ibis provision was introduced
in 1972 and quota prices have been adjusted in subsequent periods in the sane
nanner as described earlier.
Using available quarterly data from the third quarter of 1971 to the
first quarter of 1975 we first adjust the quota price for the tax saving (TS),
generating Po,calculat e r* from R/Po, and finally

>- ,

from (r*-r-tt3)/(l+r*)

given g = 0.032 and r assumed to be 0.08. '!be results are shown in Table l.
'!be mean value of r*, excluding the three d:>servations judged to be
inapplicabl e (1973:I, 1973:II, 1974:r)l4 is 0.317. 'Ibis is a surprisingl y
large nurrber of discounting the future returns from

an

investnent,1 5 and is the

evidence alluded to earlier which suggests that the purchase of fluid quota is
seen to be a particularl y risky investment. Conditional upon our estinated g
(0.032) and asswned r (0.08) values, the inplied risk of default(>-) over this
period averages 0.204 with standard
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deviation 0.011 •. 'Ibis policy or default risk is equivalent to expecting that
all rents from the quota regi.Ire will fall to zero with a one in five
probability, given no interm:!diate option of a partial reduction in rents.16
'lhe size of this expected default prooability is not sinply an artifact of.our
values of r and g; in fact, '- is quite robust to changes in these parameters.
For exanple, allowing r to vary between 0.06 and 0.10 and g between 0.02 and
0.04 causes'- to fall within the range of 0.180 and 0.225, the forrrer value
resulting from the higher discount rate corrbined with the lower growth rate,
and conversely.
An

alternative and sinpler rrethod of expressing this risk, noted

earlier, is in terms of the expected life of the asset. Asswning again that
r

= 0.08 and g = 0.032,

but solving for N instead of specifying '- gives an

inplied time h:>rizon (N) of 3. 6 years. Farrrers holding these values of r and g
will invest in fluid quota only if they can pay off the investment in at least
3.6 years.
Still, estLrnates of such large default risk raise the question of the
plausibility of the belief that there is a one in five chance that the quota
regime will be scrapped. Sorre program changes are clearly possible.

An

inportant source of these rents, the fluid milk pricing foITlllla, has been
periodically the subject of political debate, and a series of h3riculture
Ministers have publicly decried high and rising quota prices and quota
transferability•. '!be dairy sli>sidy program (FIA) rrentioned earlier lasted only
five years and paid a significant subsidy in two. Furthenoore, argurrents at
public hearings and in the rredia for dismantling this milk policy regirre are
often advanced by consurrer interests and economists. 'lherefore, a perception
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of considera ble policy risk, manifested in a large discount of future quota
returns, would not appear surprisin g .17
As large as this earnings- price ratio {r*) and policy risk apparentl y

are, they are not without corrcbora ting evidence. from trade in other governnent
"rights." 'Ibere is a well developed market for MSQ in Cntario {where MSQ can
be traded) with few. restrictio ns on quota transfera bility. Because MSQ is an
annual quota, once a unit of it is used in one year, it cannot be used again
until the following year. 'lbe quota exchange of the Oltario Milk Marketing
Board exploits this distinctio n and permits trading in two different types of
MsQ, "used" and "unused." Using Ragain to denote the rents or returns to a
unit of quota, unused MSQ will be valued as

E

R
1
.

i • l (l+r)

E

Ri

i • 0 (l+r)

whereas used MSQ will be valued as
N

N

i

• '!be differenc e in their prices will be

i
N

Ri

E

--

i • 0 (l+r)i

N
E
i =

Ri

1 (l+r) 1

-=Ro

In other words, the differenc e in price between unused and usedMSQ will offer
a direct ireasure of R, without the corrplicat ions of having to know expected
capital gains, the discount rate or the time horizon.
'Ibis MSQ exchange only began operation in March 1980, so to allow
transacti ons to reflect acquaintance with the operation of the narket we wish
to ignore the data from the first months of the rrarket's operation . No trading

in used

MSQ

occurs during August and Septeni:>er due to the.defin ition of the

dairy year. Consequently we choose data from the new dairy year {which begins
in August) , leaving us four ci:>servations (January data is generated by quota
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bidding in Decerrber) from the 1980 calendar year. '!he average price differenc e
between unused and used
an average

MSQ

MSQ

over this period was 10.25 cents per litre. Given

(unused) price over the same period of 35.95 cents per litre,

when adjusted by the expected tax saving, the earnings- price ratio (r*) is 29.0
percent. If we assume values of rand g, we can determine the irrplied default
risk • We can let r = 0.08 as before, but we have no infornati on on expected
capital gains experience, given the newness of the narket. If we assume a
small real capital gain per year, say g = 0.02, the resulting >.. is 0.18.
Alternati vely, the inplied time horizon using the same rand g values, setting
A= 0 and solving for N is 4 years •

.Admittedly these data are for a different province, time period and
asset, industria l milk quota in 1980 in Cntario instead of fluid milk quota in
the 1971-75 period in British ColUIIbia, but the apparent default risks and
earnings- price ratios are renarkably similar. 'Ihese <l'ltario data, by offering
direct infornati on on Rand r*, offer some support for our less direct measure
of r* of B.Ce; a~d support clearly the notion that these milk quotas are assets
with considera ble perceived risk. Casual evidence to support these results,
that milk quota in Cntario and B.C. is risky enough to require a planning
horizon of about four years is also found in Broadwith & Hughes (1979) and
Arcus (1977) •
Poultry production in canada is also regulated by quotas and these
narkets can provide additiona l verificat ion of our results. Despite.
difficult ies in Raking accurate quota price ooservations due to thin narkets
and restrictio ns on quota transfer in some jurisdict ions, the quota can be
rented in the (ntario broiler and egg narkets. '!his gives us a direct measure
of r* and subject to the
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diffic ulties of determining expected growth rates in quota prices , we can
estina te the defau lt risk for each rrarket, albeit with less confidence than
in
the case of the dairy rrarkets.
For Ontar io egg quotas we have eight years of quota price ct>servations
and five years of ct>servations on rental prices . '!he earnin gs-pri ce ratio,
r*,
averages 0.18 over the 1978-81 period . Capita l gains experience has been
more
errati c here, and appare ntly increa sing over time, but using g = 0.10 and
r =
0.08, we d::>tain an estimated A of 0.17. In the Ontario broile r rrarket
we have
quota price data from 1976 to 1983, genera ting an expected annual capita
l gain
of O.14 by the same nethods of calcu lation as alread y discus sed. For the
single year, 1983, we have an earnin gs-pri ce ratio, r*, of 0.1514, result
ing in
an estirra ted ). of 0.18. Despite admit tedly noisy data and the appar ently
large influe nce of capita l gains , these rrarkets also show quota purch asers
to
discou nt future return s heavil y and quota prices errbody a percei ved defau
lt
risk of between one in five and one in six.
Final ly, there is consis tent evidence from an entire ly differ ent
jurisd iction , the case of North Carolina tct>acco allotn ents. Seagraves
(1969)
has estimated the rate of return or discou nt rate (approximate
ly r* in our

terminology) on these td::>acco allotn ents, and from 1945 to 1962 this discou
nt
rate averaged 26 percen t. His estima tes also revealed an intere sting relate
d
phenomenon, that the discou nt rate has gener ally been fallin g over time,
to
average 16 percen t in the last ten years of his data. We are unable to test
this trend with our limite d nunber of years of B.C. data, but we see that
such
a trend could arise from a reduced prct>a bility of defau lt, increa sed
expec tation of capita l gains or increased diver sifica tion. 'Ibis result
also
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suggest s some caution in applying a discount rate estimate d at one point in
time to quota market data sare years later.

ea,1cu 1at~ Sup,pzy Price
We are now in a position to solve ·equation (7) for the annual produc
tion rent, R, in the year 1980 for the B.C. dairy industry . 'Ibis aroounts to
calcula ting r* for 1980, and because we know Po(= $86.15 per hectoli tre), we
can calcula te the annual rent R per hectoli tre of milk • our estimate of g is
0.0925 and we continue to assune r to be 0.08 and N to be infinity . We apply
the default prd:>ability estimated in the 1971-75 period

( :>.

= 0.204) to this

1980 market on the assUIIption that this parameter has not changed over this
period. Ch the basis of these rnean values, r* = 0.2406, and the annual rent,
R, is calculat ed to be $20.73 per annual hectoli tre of milk produced (or quota
rented) . Given that the price of quota milk (P0n) was $42.16, the aggrEcqate
supply price (C) is calcula ted to be $21.43 per hl. 'Ibis value gives the
striking result that virtuall y one-hal f of the price of fluid milk paid to B.C.
producers goes toward the cost (rent) of the quota and the remaining one-hal f
pays for the cost of real inputs.
'lhese results , however, are based upon point estimate s of parameters
neasured with possible error. Considering a range of likely rand g values for
the 1971-75 period, :>. was earlier estimated to lie within the range (0.18,
0.225). hJain we will conside r the value of r to lie in the range (0.06,
0.10), and to cover a wide range of possible expecta tions of future real
capital gains, we let g vary between 0.07 and 0.11. 'lhis variatio n in
parameters places bounds on r* of (0.207, 0.277). In turn, the rent R will lie
between $17.86 and $23.90, and the resultin g supply price, C, is between $18.26
and $24.30 per hectoli tre.

32

Cnce again, the Ontario

MSQ

rrarket data offers corroborati on. Recall

that the production rent, R, was rreasured directly as $10.25/hl. Given an
average industrial milk price of $32.76, the supply price of milk in Ontario in
1980 was $22.51/hl. 'Ibis value is calculated directly, without reference to

capital gains issues or estinated discount rates, default risks, and so forth.
'!he similarity of this value of our estinate of the B.C. supply price is
encouraging, despite differences in production conditions between the two
'

regions. However, given the range of possible supply prices in B.C. noted
above, we have insufficien t precision in our rrean estirrate to conclude that
B.C. producers have lower costs at the rrargin than their Ontario counterpart s.
Finally, recently collected average variable cost data for a sanple of
these B.C. milk producers for the year 1981 provides an additional data source
with which to test our results. When we take the largest one-third of sanpled
farms, on the assurrption that these are the firms buying quota, and deflate
their costs back to 1980 at the rate of inflation (12.5) percent, we ootain a
cost estimate of $22.16/hl. This estinate represents average variable, not
narginal costs, and errbodies an assurrption of constant costs between 1981 and
1980, but nevertheles s is sufficientl y close to our estirrate to constitute an

additional rreasure of support.
It is useful at this point to contrast these results with the results
one would ootain by applying the standard m:>del, where R =

iPo.

'!he average

(naninal) interest rate on farm debt across Canada was 12 percent in 1980, and
the average rrarket price of quota (unadjusted) was $96.44~ '!he resulting annual
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rent to the quota is then $11. 57/hl., cq:;proxinately one-ha. ~ of the value cb
tained with the IOOdel SlXjgested in this paper. Similarly, the calculated sup
ply price would then be $30.60/hl., forty percent above our estinate. such an
estinate suggests not only the inplausible result that B.C. milk producers are
nuch less efficient at the margin than their Oltario counterpart s, but that
narginal costs are so close to the price of

MSQ

value to that quota and little demand for it.

milk that there would be little

In fact, there is considerabl e

excess demand for this· (untraded) quota and despite sizeable penalties there is
production in excess of it.

9mlY.fil.QD
It is the purpose of this paper to give some illustration of the
infornation which can be provided by the market for a goverrurent right, in this
case, an agricultura l marketing quota. Not only can the private value placed
on this quota provide a barorreter of the general profitabili ty of the iooustry
but it can also disclose specific infornation about otherwise unci:>served
industry supply conditions, such as the industry supply price.
In our atterrpts to estimate this supply price, however, it has becorre
apparent that the analysis of the quota nay involve-considerable conplexity.
Multiplying observed quota prices by a market interest rate, as is normally
found in the literature, does not appear to do justice to the subtleties of
_ quota ownership, and certainly yields very different results from the analysis
we propose.

For exanple the quota is an asset about which there may ·be a

perception of considerabl e risk, especially the policy or default risk of
possible changes in or elimination of the profitable quota regime. It may
possess the prospect of earning increasing production rents, hence capital
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gains , over time, as well as additi onal benef its such as tax advantages.
Ehpir ical inplen entati on of this more detail ed IOOdel required both
additi onal data and instit ution al detai l, partic ularly in determining the
prooa bility of defau lt and earnings:-price ratio ("discount rate") • Cnly
through fortui tous policy changes were we able to obtain neasures of this
risk
involved in holding fluid quota in the B.C. milk indus try, and that eviden
ce
nay be unavailable in some jurisd iction s.
Nevertheless, it was feasib le in the case of the B.C. milk indust ry to
obtain estima tes of allros t all required paran eters and the result s are
corroborated by a variet y of additi onal evidence. First , our result s show
that
B.C. fluid milk quota is perceived to be a very risky asset , with an
earnin gs-pri ce ratio of 32 perce nt. By assuming a discou nt rate of 8 percen
t
enbody ing a risk premium for system atic risk and the possi bility
of any
under divers ified nonsy stenat ic risk, we estimated a percei ved proba bility
of
defau lt, that the mnopoly rents of the quota system would end, of 20 perce
nt.
More direct evidence from the Chtari o indus trial milk market produces a
very
simila r result (an earnin gs-pri ce ratio of 29 perce nt, or a defau lt prooa
bility
of 18 perce nt), providing errpir ical support for both our result and our
less
direc t calcul ation procedure. Similar result s were suggested by data from
Cntar io poultr y narke ts. '!be annual rent earned by B.C. fluid quota averag
es
__ $21/h l. in 1980, about one-h alf the price of fluid quota milk, and this
contra sts with the result of $12/h l. obtained with the sirrple IOOdel of quota
valua tion.
'lhe result ing supply price for milk in B.C. is calcul ated to be almost
$21.5 0/hl. in 1980. 'Ibis is supported by the conparable value of $22.SO
/hl.
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in Oltario, arrived at without need for data on discount rates, capital gains

or other benefits. In addition, average variable cost data from 1981 for the
largest third of sanpled farms, deflated back to 1980 dollars, gives a value of
$22.16/hl.

Given the transfer of production knowledge and genetic material

across Canada, the Oltario data is likely to represent a better yardstick of
conparison, and they provide support for both the B.C. supply price estina.te
and the quota valuation rrooel. 'lhese nurrbers contrast sharply with the result
d:>tained from the sirrple rrodel, where the B.C. suwly price is estirrated at
$31/hl., a clearly in-plausible estinate given the excess demand for industrial

milk quota.
Although we are encouraged by what enpirical support we have for our
estimates, it should be cbvious that we can claim no pt"ecision in the supply
price estimation undertaken here. '!he results are best interpreted as point
estimates, and four sources of possible error can be identified. Given the
erratic nature of the capital gains series, the estimate of g is sensitive to
the expectation s process assumed, hence may introduce error. Second, the
estimate of default risk

(A)

used for 1980 was cbtained from 1971 - 1975 data

and it is possible that it may have changed over the period. '!bird, the choice
of discount rate used in initially estimating

A

and sli>sequently estimating

the quota rent may have introduced a small error because the.resultin g supply
--price is not independent of the discount rate chosen. In the same vein, the
results are slightly affected by the characteriz ation of risk which is chosen.
Fourth, the assunption of profit maximization with respect to quota purchase is
made throughout the paper and if persistent errors are made over time, our
results lose some of their significanc e. Finally, although we have considered
benefits to the quota in addition to the production rent, there may be other
factors we have missed.
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A range of probable supply price estirrates was d:>tained by varying the
parameter values of r, g and >. • Considering the discount rate between 0.06
and 0.10, the rate of expected capital gains between 0.07 and 0.11, and the
default risk probabili ty between O.l80 and 0.225,, the resulting supply price
ranged from $18.26/hl . to $24.30/h l., a fairly narrow range given the wide
variation in parameter values. 'Ibis band could be narrowed by further work in
this area, but it still shows the supply price to be well below the sinple
model estirrate of $31/hl.
What are now needed to test the realism of the procedures followed here
(or the efficienc y with which the quota market works) are alternati ve neasures
of the quota rent or the supply price. '!here are several possible options
here, including the collectio n of actual cost data, but they represent work for
another paper.
Finally, the results themselves suggest several inplicati ons. First,
the default risk which we have neasured for agricultu ral marketing quotas may
be inportant in a variety of government programs which provide rents to certain
groups, from inport quotas to farm price supports. Che might expect that a
high discount of future returns (rents) takes place in arriving at the stock
price incorpora ting these returns, be it an inport license or agricultu ral
land. Second, the supply price estirrated may be on a new supply curve corrpared
to the unregulat ed supply curve if the operation s of the marketing board have
changed real resource costs at the farm level. 'lhird, in contrast to clairrs
that supply management marketing boards are socially efficient because they
reduce price risk to farm producers, this work suggests that the boards create
an inportant elenent of risk as well. Finally, the level of the supply price

r
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is inportant for determining both income transfers and efficiency effects of
the regi.ne.

Although these effects are not calculated here, the size of the

quota rent makes clear that income transfers in this market are very large.
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Footnotes
1. Marketing boards are statutory institution s, formed in a nunber of

developed and developing countries to intervene in prirrary product (usually
agricultura l) rrarkets. 'lbeir objectives are typically to "inprove" the
narketing process, which often means controlling rrarket participant s,
stabilizing and sometimes increasing producer prices.

See

Hoos (1979) for

internation al corrparisons of these boards.
2. Although rrarketing boards are ptevalent in some developing
countries, notably West Africa, this problem does not presently arise there.
Marketing boards in those regions act roore to inpose an export tax, limiting
domestic production by reducing the producer price. Cnly if producer prices
were raised above equilibrium levels would quotas become a policy tool in
those countries.
3. Although

Q

is typically shown to be less than Oe, the quota rray

be inposed at any level of output, greater or less than Oe. It effectively
contrains output and becomes valuable when its associated output price exceeds
the supply price, creating rents at the rrargin of production.

4. It should be noted that g can take on negative as well as positive
values. Although uncomoon, negative price appreciatio n has been observed in
some years and over nulti-year periods in some jurisdictio ns.

As

well, recent

Canadian dairy industry experience with a shrinking industrial milk rrarket has
offered exanples of quota cutbacks, reducing individual quota holdings across
the board.

s.

Confusion on this general issue of rrarginal versus infrarrargin al

returns in analyzing quotas is illustrated in Department of Finance (1981) and
(Barichello , 1982).
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6. '!he added cost of planning and adjusting biological production
systems to meet known annual or even m:>nthly quotas is one exanple of the
reverse effect, shifting the supply curve to the left. When quota levels are
altered, especially with short notice (as can be the case '-:,+=n demand changes
unexpectedly), these planning and adjustment costs increase, shifting the
supply curve further left. It would be interesting to test the hypothesis
that whatever the increase in price stability caused by these marketing board
·regimes, it is ootained at the expense of increased quantity instability.
7. Kletzer raises another issue that would seem to have application
to these quota-controlle d markets (or any markets with significant governnent
intervention) • Because the lender to a foreign government is likely to have
less information than the borrower about the likelihood of default, the lender
has an incentive to acquire more information. In quota markets, this
translates as the farner having insufficient infornation about the likelihood
of policy change by the government.

It would be profitable for farmers to

increase their infornation by becaning more involved with the goverrurent in
the relevant policy areas. In fact, one ooserves in canada an increased
demand for joint policy decision-naking between farm groups and the governnent
in those areas where government intervention is greatest.

'Ibis ld::>by activity

can then be explained as an attenpt to decrease the policy or default risk in
addition to the more familiar atterrpt to increase farmers' returns or wealth.
8. Note that this is analogous to pricing the quota as a call option.
'lhe quota holder is "in the money" (in options terminology, the fublre stock
price exceeds the exercise price) as long as the quota regime and rents are
naintained, but if the quota scheme is scrapped, his quota asset is worthless
like a call option when the stock price stays below the exercise price.
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Assuming risk-neutra lity, the current call price is the expected value of next
periods price defined over •pseudo-pr cbabilities" , analogous to our
1 -

A and

A•

9. In five years of BOW' collection of individual prices, virtually

all rronths show the range of prices within four percent of the mean value.
10. Because of the conpetitive narket, visible quota prices and low
transaction costs, save for the snaller farms for whom the mininum transaction
size is a significant proportion of their production, there should be a stron:J
tendency for the stock price of quota to be equated across farms. 'Ibis is
consistent with the low dispersion in reported prices. '!be tendency toward
equalizing narginal costs across firms, while present in the lon:J run, will be
weaker in the short run due to possible differences across farms in the other
variables of equation (6}, notably different expectation s of capital gains and
perception of the risk.
11. It is encouraging that on the basis of personal experience in
this industry I arrived at a similar figure (a more conservativ e 7 percent)
using more arbitrary ad hoc procedures.
12. 'Ibis is still consistent with earlier work by Jenkins (1972) where
the rate of return in agriculture during the 1960's is estinated to be within
the range of 5 to 7 percent.
13. 'Ibis provides an additional argwrent for deleting the two
observation s noted earlier, but also draws attention to the first quarter of
1974 when the FIA program was first introduced. Much uncertainty existed
about the nature of the program and its effect on fluid quota, resulting in a
noticeable increase in the inplied discount rate.

(See

Table 1). 'Ibis would

appear to be a clear case of unusual circumstances leading to an added
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discount of current returns and a resulting discount rate estinate of little
value to us in measuring longer term default probabil ities. 'lherefore , we do
not include the 1974 first quarter observation when calculati ng the m:an value

of r.
14. Including all ooservati ons raises the average r* to 0.329, but
increases the dispersio n (measured by standard deviation ) by more than 60
percent to 0.030.
15.

By

contrast, other asset narkets disclose inplied discount rates

at mre familiar levels. Berck (1979) found that tinber cutting practices of
o.s. Pacific Northwest lurrber conpanies inplied a real discount rate of 5
percent. In addition, Johnson and Kaserman (1983) explored the private
housing narket to determine the degree to which energy-saving investments were
capitaliz ed into the market price. 'lbe range of real discount rates inplied
were 6.3 to 8.4 percent.
16. Admitting these intermed iate options would inply an even larger
expected probabili ty that

~

reduction in rents will occur.

17. Past successes of the dairy ld::>by would do little to reduce this
risk if continual difficult y was seen in nd::>ilizing fellow producers and
persuading governments in an increasin gly urban environment. 'Ibis perceptio n
appears to be held by many individua l dairymen and particula rly by those
industry leaders who are active in lobby efforts. It is for this reason that
we have nooelled the annual default prcbabili ty as being independent of
previous years' outcomes.
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APPEIDIX 1

B.C. FI.llid Milk Qiota Prices and Price Changes, 1971-1983,
($ per daily pound, nominal values)

QJota Price/lb .
$

1971
1972
1973
1974

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

1980
1981
1982
1983

$35.67
37.80
36.80
36.32
57.98
76.57
93.03
121.31
137.57
155.07
150.51
155.28
200

lbninal Percentage
Olange from

Previous -Year ·

Real Percentage
Olange from

Previous Year

+ 6.0
- 2.6
- 1.3
+59.6
+32,1
+21.5
+30.4
+13.4
+12.7
- 2.9
+ 3.2
+29

Source: Grubel and Schwindt (1977), B.C. Ministry of Agricultu re

+ 1.0
-11.7
-16.6
+48.9
+22.6
+14.4
+23.9
+ 3.1
+ 1.6
-13.0
- 7.5
+20
and Food,

Month)3 -Iwt,tt :Cost -survey, 1979 to 1983, private camunica tion with

brokers, GNE irrplicit price deflator.

.

'

.

TABLE 1

Net Returns, Prices, "Discount Rates" and Implied Default Probabilities C\)
for B.C. Fluid Milk Quota
1971 - 1975, R and P0 in $/hl, 1971 dollars
Po

*

r*

X

7.05

23.05

0.306

6.79

20.96

0.324

0.197
0.208

I

6.88

23.42

0.294

0.190

II

7 .13

23.42

0.304

III

7.03

21.08

0.334

0.197 .
0.214

IV

7.43

0.348

0.222

I

7.97

21.37
20.47

0.246

II

7.57
6.82

20.91

0.389
0.362

0.231

20.68

0.330

0.212

Quarter

1971
1972

1973

·III
'IV

III
1974

1975

IV
I
II
III
.. IV
I

R

-

..

5.59
6.94

18.39

0.304

0.196

18.36

0.378

0.240

6~61

19.45

0.31-10

0.218

5.20

0.289

0.187

5.07

17-96
16.16

0.314

0.202

5.47

17.35

0.315

0.203

